Work Motivation and Teams

44 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2018

See all articles by Simone Haeckl

Simone Haeckl

WU - Vienna University of Economics and Business; Vienna Center for Experimental Economics

Rupert Sausgruber

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 23, 2018

Abstract

We provide a new measure of work motivation and show that motivation shapes the effects of team incentives and observation by peers on performance. In particular, we measure motivation to work hard as the deviation from the money-maximizing benchmark in a real-effort experiment. While we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we find that highly motivated workers do not respond. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard and increasing effort even further is very costly to them.

Keywords: real-effort experiment, cooperation, team, intrinsic motivation, labors

JEL Classification: C91, J33, L20

Suggested Citation

Haeckl, Simone and Sausgruber, Rupert and Tyran, Jean-Robert, Work Motivation and Teams (August 23, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3239948

Simone Haeckl

WU - Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

Vienna Center for Experimental Economics ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Rupert Sausgruber

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, 1020
Austria
+43 1 31336 4572 (Phone)

Jean-Robert Tyran (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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