Quantifying the Deterrent Effect of Anticartel Enforcement

17 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2018

See all articles by S. W. Davies

S. W. Davies

University of East Anglia (UEA)

Franco Mariuzzo

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

Peter L. Ormosi

Norwich Business School; University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

JEL Classification: H11, K21, L44

Suggested Citation

Davies, Steve W. and Mariuzzo, Franco and Ormosi, Peter L. and Ormosi, Peter L., Quantifying the Deterrent Effect of Anticartel Enforcement (October 2018). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, Issue 4, pp. 1933-1949, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12574

Steve W. Davies (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

Franco Mariuzzo

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

Peter L. Ormosi

Norwich Business School ( email )

Norwich
NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

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