Striking a Balance of Power between the Court of Justice and the EU Legislature: The Law on Competition Damages Actions as a Paradigm

European Law Review, Volume 43, Issue 6, pp. 837-857, 2018

22 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last revised: 27 Nov 2019

See all articles by Jens-Uwe Franck

Jens-Uwe Franck

University of Mannheim - Department of Law

Date Written: August 6, 2018

Abstract

The framework of EU law on cartel damages actions consists in part of rules established by the ECJ based on arts 101 and 102 TFEU in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness. These rules are an integral part of EU primary law. The notion of institutional balance, however, requires the Court to consider its own inherent limits on democratic legitimacy, accountability and expertise. In particular, the Court has to ensure that adequate scope remains for the EU legislature to exercise its legislative power pursuant to art.103 TFEU. It is argued that the ECJ has disregarded these restrictions and overstretched the principle of effectiveness–for instance, in its adjudication on liability for umbrella pricing and on access to leniency files, respectively. Consequently, the EU legislature must not consider itself bound by these standards.

Keywords: Institutional balance; Principle of effectiveness; Democratic legitimacy; EU competition damages law; Courage v Crehan; Directive 2014/104; Access to leniency documents

Suggested Citation

Franck, Jens-Uwe, Striking a Balance of Power between the Court of Justice and the EU Legislature: The Law on Competition Damages Actions as a Paradigm (August 6, 2018). European Law Review, Volume 43, Issue 6, pp. 837-857, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241000

Jens-Uwe Franck (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Law ( email )

Schloss WestflĂĽgel
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

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