A Dark Side of Corporate Venture Capital

46 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last revised: 29 Oct 2020

See all articles by Xuan Tian

Xuan Tian

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Kailei Ye

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

Date Written: September 2, 2020

Abstract

We examine a dark side of corporate venture capital (CVC) programs. Relying on plausibly exogenous variation in passive institutional ownership generated by Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions, we show that firms with larger passive institutional ownership cut their CVC investment. This effect is more pronounced for firms with severer managerial agency problems. Further tests show that passive institutional investors induce firms to cut CVC investment in startups that are unrelated to the firms’ core businesses and are of low quality, and when firms have poor track record on CVC investment. By doing so, firm value increases. Our paper uncovers a previously under-explored dark side of CVC programs, their giving rise to managerial agency problems, and helps provide a more complete picture when evaluating CVC programs.

Keywords: Corporate venture capital, institutional investors, agency problem, firm value

JEL Classification: G24, G23, G30

Suggested Citation

Tian, Xuan and Ye, Kailei, A Dark Side of Corporate Venture Capital (September 2, 2020). PBCSF-NIFR Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241866 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3241866

Xuan Tian

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance ( email )

No. 43, Chengfu Road
Haidian District
Beijing 100083
China
+86-10-62794103 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://xuantian.info/

Kailei Ye (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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