Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Anti-Mafia Enforcement Actions

82 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2018 Last revised: 27 Jun 2023

See all articles by Pablo Slutzky

Pablo Slutzky

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Stefan Zeume

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Date Written: June 27, 2023

Abstract

We exploit staggered municipality-level anti-mafia enforcement actions in Italy over the
1995–2015 period to study how the presence of organized crime affects firms. Following
enforcement actions, we find increases in competition (i) among firms and (ii) for public
procurement contracts. Firms that do not exit after a weakening of organized crime shrink in
size, more so when operating in the non-tradable sector. Our findings are consistent with
organized crime acting as a barrier to entry and affecting local economic activity.

Keywords: Organized Crime, Corruption, Competition, Money Laundering

JEL Classification: D73, K42, G38, H75

Suggested Citation

Slutzky, Pablo and Zeume, Stefan, Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Anti-Mafia Enforcement Actions (June 27, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3242495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242495

Pablo Slutzky

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States

Stefan Zeume (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
675
Abstract Views
3,183
Rank
70,214
PlumX Metrics