Multiproduct Mergers and Quality Competition

49 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2018  

Justin P. Johnson

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Andrew Rhodes

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: September 4, 2018

Abstract

We investigate mergers in markets where quality differences between products are important, there are multiproduct firms, and firms compete in quantities. Mergers without synergies may raise consumer surplus, but only when the pre-merger industry structure satisfies certain observable features. Synergies may lower consumer surplus. Mergers are more readily profitable when an industry exhibits multiple qualities, and mergers between small numbers of firms with small market shares may be profitable. We provide a new measure of industry concentration: the Quality-adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index extends the standard Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to markets in which quality differences are central. We extend the analysis of external effects to a multiproduct setting, and show that some non-merging firms may benefit while others lose following a merger.

Keywords: Merger, multiproduct firm, synergy

JEL Classification: K2, L4

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Justin P. and Rhodes, Andrew, Multiproduct Mergers and Quality Competition (September 4, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243848 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3243848

Justin P. Johnson (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Andrew Rhodes

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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