Disclosure of Inside Information

The Transparency of Stock Corporations in Europe (R Veil and V Tountopoulos, eds., Forthcoming)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 422/2018

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8/2019

27 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2018 Last revised: 4 Sep 2019

See all articles by Jennifer Payne

Jennifer Payne

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Date Written: September 5, 2018

Abstract

The disclosure of inside information is a core component of EU capital market regulation. It underpins the market abuse regime, providing information to investors, and robbing it of its “inside” quality. Different regimes tackle the issue of inside information disclosure in distinct ways. The EU regime of continuous disclosure stands in sharp contrast to the approach adopted in the US and this paper considers the pros and cons of the EU’s approach. This paper argues that the EU provisions are preferable, and are more likely to promote market efficiency, but the EU regime also creates potential dangers and disadvantages for companies who are the subject of the disclosure obligations. Sufficient flexibility is therefore needed to capture the benefits of continuous disclosure without imposing undue burdens on issuers in the process.

Keywords: disclosure, inside information, market abuse, EU financial markets, Market Abuse Regulation

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Payne, Jennifer, Disclosure of Inside Information (September 5, 2018). The Transparency of Stock Corporations in Europe (R Veil and V Tountopoulos, eds., Forthcoming), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 422/2018, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8/2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244401

Jennifer Payne (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

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