Canonical Cases and Other Quodlibets: A Response to Professor Fallon

97 Texas Law Review Online __ (Dec. 2018, Forthcoming)

12 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2018

See all articles by Seth Barrett Tillman

Seth Barrett Tillman

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: October 30, 2018

Abstract

In a far ranging 2018 article in Texas Law Review, Professor Fallon opines on the scope of the duty of subordinate Executive Branch officers to obey conflicting commands and policies emanating from the President and the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. The subject is not an easy one. It is a question which cannot be answered by turning exclusively to the past practices of executive officers during times of crisis and conflict—i.e., crises in the country and conflict between the branches of the federal government. Nor can it be answered by turning exclusively to the decisions of the courts. Still, those practices and decisions are important starting points for Fallon’s argument. I have some substantial (and long-standing) doubts about Fallon’s discussion of three well known, if not canonical, cases. My goal, then, is to explain why I think Fallon’s discussion of these cases is—wrong, and then to suggest what may follow from those errors.

Suggested Citation

Tillman, Seth Barrett, Canonical Cases and Other Quodlibets: A Response to Professor Fallon (October 30, 2018). 97 Texas Law Review Online __ (Dec. 2018, Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246598

Seth Barrett Tillman (Contact Author)

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Ollscoil na hÉireann, Má Nuad
New House (#306)
Maynooth, County Kildare
Ireland
(353) (0) 1474-7216 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.nuim.ie/staff/mr-seth-barrett-tillman

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