Competition for Versus on the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment

28 Pages Posted: 12 May 2003

See all articles by James C. Cox

James C. Cox

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Theo Offerman

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE)

Mark Olson

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES); George Mason University - Department of Economics

Arthur J. H. C. Schram

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB); Tinbergen Institute

Abstract

European countries and Japan are contemplating more competition in passenger rail service. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Transport was assigned responsibility for making a recommendation to Parliament for choosing between competition for the rails and competition on the rails. The Ministry commissioned the experiments reported here to acquire better understanding of the properties of the alternative policies. Competition on the rails involves allocation of rights to use station and time-slot routes by price bids in a combinatorial auction. Competition for the rails involves allocation of rights to regional monopolies by fare-structure bids for supplying a prespecified minimum schedule.

Suggested Citation

Cox, James C. and Offerman, Theo and Olson, Mark A. and Schram, Arthur J. H. C., Competition for Versus on the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=324690

James C. Cox (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-651-8888 (Phone)
404-651-0425 (Fax)

Theo Offerman

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4294 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

Mark A. Olson

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES)

400P Truland Building
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Arthur J. H. C. Schram

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
CREED
Amsterdam 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 (0)20 525 4293 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/PEOPLE/Arthurs.htm

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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