Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation

16 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2018

See all articles by Dennis Patterson

Dennis Patterson

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

Suggested Citation

Patterson, Dennis, Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation (September 2018). Ratio Juris, Vol. 31, Issue 3, pp. 260-275, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12216

Dennis Patterson (Contact Author)

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey ( email )

311 North 5th Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08854
United States

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