The Antitrust Case Against Facebook

Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 16, Issue 1, Forthcoming

63 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2019 Last revised: 19 Jan 2021

See all articles by Dina Srinivasan

Dina Srinivasan

Thurman Arnold Project; Yale University - Law School

Date Written: September 10, 2018

Abstract

The Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) social network, this era’s new communications service, plays an important role in the lives of 2+ billion people across the world. Though the market was highly competitive in the beginning, it has since consolidated in Facebook’s favor. Today, using Facebook means to accept a product linked to broad-scale commercial surveillance — a paradox in a democracy. This Paper argues that Facebook’s ability to extract this qualitative exchange from consumers is merely this titan’s form of monopoly rents. The history of early competition, Facebook’s market entry, and Facebook’s subsequent rise tells the story of Facebook’s monopoly power. However, the history which elucidates this firm’s dominance also presents a story of anticompetitive conduct. Facebook’s pattern of false statements and misleading conduct induced consumers to trust and choose Facebook, to the detriment of market competitors and consumers' own welfare.

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, two-sided platforms, two-sided markets, facebook, big tech, anticompetitive, consumer welfare, privacy, democracy, commercial surveillance, surveillance, monopoly power, collusion, sherman act, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41, L42, L44, D22, D42, D61

Suggested Citation

Srinivasan, Dina, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook (September 10, 2018). Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 16, Issue 1, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247362

Dina Srinivasan (Contact Author)

Thurman Arnold Project ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

Yale University - Law School ( email )

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