Distributed Ledgers and Secure Multi-Party Computation for Financial Reporting and Auditing

Management Science, Forthcoming

58 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2018 Last revised: 26 Sep 2023

See all articles by Sean Cao

Sean Cao

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Lin William Cong

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Baozhong Yang

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business

Date Written: May 09, 2024

Abstract

To understand the disruption and implications of distributed ledger technologies for financial reporting and auditing, we analyze firm misreporting, auditor monitoring and competition, and regulatory policy in a unified model. A federated blockchain for financial reporting and auditing can improve verification efficiency not only for transactions in private databases, but also for cross-chain verifications through privacy-preserving computation protocols. Despite the potential benefit of blockchains, private incentives for firms and first-mover advantages for auditors can create inefficient under-adoption or partial adoption that favors larger auditors. Although a regulator can help coordinate the adoption of technology, endogenous choice of transaction partners by firms can still lead to adoption failure. Our model also provides an initial framework for further studies of the costs and implications of the use of distributed ledgers and secure multi-party computation in financial reporting, including the positive spillover to discretionary auditing and who should bear the cost of adoption.

Keywords: Accounting, FinTech, Misreporting, Monitoring, Permissioned Blockchains, Privacy Preservation, Interoperability, Technology Adoption

JEL Classification: D21, D40, G32, G34, M42, M48

Suggested Citation

Cao, Sean S. and Cong, Lin and Yang, Baozhong, Distributed Ledgers and Secure Multi-Party Computation for Financial Reporting and Auditing (May 09, 2024). Management Science, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248002 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3248002

Sean S. Cao

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States

Lin Cong (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.linwilliamcong.com/

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Baozhong Yang

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business ( email )

35 Broad St NW
Atlanta, GA Ga 30303-3083
United States
4044137350 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/baozhongyang/home

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