The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets

Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 54, Issue 4, June 2019, Pages 741-774

48 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2018 Last revised: 13 Feb 2020

See all articles by A. Douglas Melamed

A. Douglas Melamed

Stanford Law School

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Date Written: October 30, 2018

Abstract

This paper discusses the recent scholarly and policy attack against the consumer welfare (“CW”) standard. It shows that the CW standard is not the explanatory factor for perceived low levels of antitrust enforcement in the US. The arguments made against the CW standard reflect a misunderstanding of its purpose and effects. Moreover, any deviation from the CW framework would likely weaken antitrust enforcement in the platform age.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Law, Consumer Welfare, Monopoly, Market Power, Platform

JEL Classification: K20, K21, L41, L4, L10, L20

Suggested Citation

Melamed, Doug and Petit, Nicolas, The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets (October 30, 2018). Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 54, Issue 4, June 2019, Pages 741-774 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3248140

Doug Melamed

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

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