Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules

71 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2018 Last revised: 27 May 2023

See all articles by T. Renee Bowen

T. Renee Bowen

University of California, San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Commerce and Diplomacy (CCD)

Vincent Anesi

University of Nottingham

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than constraints on redistribution.

Suggested Citation

Bowen, T. Renee and Anesi, Vincent, Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules (September 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w25033, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250550

T. Renee Bowen (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/tamarareneebowenlyn/

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

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Center for Commerce and Diplomacy (CCD) ( email )

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Vincent Anesi

University of Nottingham ( email )

School of Economics, Room B18,
SCG, University of Nottingham
Nottingham, NG7 1GD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vincentanesi-economics.net/

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