Corporate Tax Benefits from Politicians’ Hometown
49 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2018
Date Written: September 18, 2018
This paper investigates the impact of the geographic coincidence of firms and political leaders on corporate tax benefits. Taking advantage of a unique tax disclosure rule in China, which allows us to identify firm-specific tax benefits, we find that firms enjoy more favorable tax treatments if their registered city is the incumbent provincial leader’s hometown. This result is not driven by quid-pro-quo exchanges and informational advantage of the political leader. However, the effect is attenuated when the leader has stronger promotion incentives. Moreover, we show heterogeneities in the effect of hometown connection on corporate tax benefits in terms of the cost-benefit trade-off. Overall, our study sheds light on how the social identity of politicians engenders tax benefits for business entities.
Keywords: Political Leaders; Hometown; Social Identity; Tax Benefits
JEL Classification: H26; H71; M48
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