Political Connections and Corporate Borrowing: An Analysis on the Listed Real Estate Firms in China

Posted: 11 Oct 2018

See all articles by Zan Yang

Zan Yang

Tsinghua University

Ying Fan

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Song Shi

University of Technology Sydney (UTS)

Jing Liao

Massey University - School of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 18, 2018

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political connections and corporate borrowing behavior using the listed real estate development firms in China from 2001 to 2014. Evidence from China is of particular importance due to China being the world's largest emerging and transition economy. We find that the benefit of political connections is manifested in firms obtaining loans from state-controlled banks in the first instance, but that political influence diminishes over subsequent loan extensions. the performance based requirement prevents banks providing systemic favorable treatment to the connected real estate firms, especially after the Chinese banking system reform in 2006. The results provide fresh insight on the risks and benefits of political connections in the Chinese real estate market as it transitions from a centrally planned to a market based economy under on-going market oriented banking and political reforms.

Keywords: Political Connections; Corporate Borrowing; Listed Real Estate Firms; China

JEL Classification: G3; G2; H7; P2

Suggested Citation

Yang, Zan and Fan, Ying and Shi, Song and Liao, Jing, Political Connections and Corporate Borrowing: An Analysis on the Listed Real Estate Firms in China (September 18, 2018). Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251468

Zan Yang (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

Ying Fan

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

11 Yuk Choi Rd
Hung Hom
Hong Kong

Song Shi

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) ( email )

15 Broadway, Ultimo
PO Box 123
Sydney, NSW 2007
Australia

Jing Liao

Massey University - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

Private Bag 11-222
Palmerston North, 30974
New Zealand

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