Why Populism? How Parties Shape the Electoral Fortune of Populists

35 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2018

See all articles by Darin Self

Darin Self

Cornell University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Government

Allen Hicken

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

Much of the literature on populism restricts itself to specific regional contexts. Due to this approach, theories of populism have difficulty explaining cross-regional similarities or differences (such as the prevalence of exclusive populist parties in Europe but inclusive parties in Latin America). Using cross-regional data and exploratory case studies from multiple regions, we provide evidence that the prevalence of populism in a given party system is a function of both party institutionalization and electoral institutions. The combination of these factors we term institutional hostility. In laying out our theory we identify three ways in which populist parties enter party systems and contest elections: populist entry, populist targeting and adaptation, and populist capture.

Suggested Citation

Self, Darin and Hicken, Allen, Why Populism? How Parties Shape the Electoral Fortune of Populists (September 2018). V-Dem Working Paper 2018:76. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251696 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251696

Darin Self (Contact Author)

Cornell University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Government ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Allen Hicken

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

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