Austrian Law and Economics and Efficiency in the Common Law

Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, Todd Zywicki and Peter Boettke (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2017

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-30

29 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2018

See all articles by Todd J. Zywicki

Todd J. Zywicki

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Edward Peter Stringham

Trinity College; American Institute for Economic Research

Date Written: September 19, 2018

Abstract

Is the common law efficient? Neoclassical economists debate whether our inherited systems of judge-made law maximize wealth whereas Austrian economists typically adopt much different standards. The article reviews neoclassical and Austrian arguments about efficiency in the common law. After presenting Hayek’s views on the common law as a spontaneous order it concludes that the common law can indeed be viewed as a spontaneous order only when judges provide their services in a free and competitive system.

Suggested Citation

Zywicki, Todd J. and Stringham, Edward Peter, Austrian Law and Economics and Efficiency in the Common Law (September 19, 2018). Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, Todd Zywicki and Peter Boettke (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2017; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252032

Todd J. Zywicki (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8091 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Edward Peter Stringham

Trinity College ( email )

Hartford, CT 06106
United States

American Institute for Economic Research ( email )

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

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