Firms, Trade and Profit Shifting: Evidence from Aggregate Data

55 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2018

See all articles by Sébastien Laffitte

Sébastien Laffitte

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

Farid Toubal

Université Paris Dauphine; Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales (CEPII); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 02, 2018

Abstract

Using aggregate data on U.S. multinational firms’ activities, we document the impact of tax havens on the organization and trade of multinational firms. Conventional wisdom says that MNEs set up foreign sales platforms close to large markets to benefit from the proximity to consumers. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that the tax environment plays an important role in explaining the location of the foreign sales platforms. We document that foreign sales platforms in tax havens fuel profit shifting especially in services industries. We shed lights on the attractiveness of different tax havens for distinctive sectoral activities. The back-of-the-envelope computation shows that profit shifting by foreign sales platforms in tax haven amounts to $83bn in 2013.

Keywords: foreign platforms, tax havens, profit shifting, firms’ organization

JEL Classification: F230, H260

Suggested Citation

Laffitte, Sébastien and Toubal, Farid, Firms, Trade and Profit Shifting: Evidence from Aggregate Data (August 02, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7171, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252354

Sébastien Laffitte

Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan (ENS) ( email )

61 avenue du président Wilson
Cachan, Paris 94235
France

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST) ( email )

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France

Farid Toubal (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales (CEPII) ( email )

9 rue Georges Pitard
Paris Cedex 15, F-75015
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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