The Entitlement Effect in the Ultimatum Game - Does It Even Exist?

63 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2018

See all articles by Elif Demiral

Elif Demiral

George Mason University

Johanna Mollerstrom

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement effect is at the core of experimental Public Choice – not just because it concerns the topics of bargaining and negotiations, but also because it relates to the question about under which circumstances actors behave more rational. We conduct three experiments, two in the laboratory and one online, with more than 1,250 participants. Our original motivation was to study gender differences, but ultimately we could not replicate the entitlement effect in the Ultimatum Game in any of our three experiments. Potential reasons for why the replication attempts fail are discussed.

Keywords: Ultimatum game, public choice, experiment, entitlement, negotiations, bargaining, replications, gender

JEL Classification: C7,C9,D72,J16

Suggested Citation

Demiral, Elif and Mollerstrom, Johanna, The Entitlement Effect in the Ultimatum Game - Does It Even Exist? (September 2018). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1756. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252431 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252431

Elif Demiral

George Mason University ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Johanna Mollerstrom (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/johannamollerstrom/

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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