Competing for Priorities in School Choice

24 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2018

See all articles by Greg Leo

Greg Leo

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Martin Van der Linden

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 20, 2018

Abstract

We present a model in which students can influence their priority in a school choice mechanism through a first-stage costly effort game. We show that efficiency improvements to the mechanism can lead to net efficiency losses if they come at the price of increased allocative inequalities, which in turn increase competition in the effort stage. We apply these results to the deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms (DA and IA) and show that, even when DA is more allocatively efficient than IA, IA may remain more efficient overall because it features less inequalities between students with high and low priorities.

Suggested Citation

Leo, Greg and Van der Linden, Martin, Competing for Priorities in School Choice (September 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252745

Greg Leo

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

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