Delegation, Collaborative Governance, and Non-Distributive Policy: The Curious Case of Joint Partnerships in American Federalism

Journal of Politics, Forthcoming

20 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2018

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Pennsylvania State University; Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI

Pamela Clouser McCann

University of Southern California

Giulia Leila Travaglini

Bocconi University

Date Written: September 23, 2018

Abstract

Although Congress often utilizes grants and other fiscal incentives when delegating policy to the states, it also incorporates non-fiscal arrangements, or joint partnerships into legislation. These partnerships include joint state-federal oversight boards, intergovernmental task forces, as well as other non- distributive programs and services. We examine the conditions under which Congress chooses to increase joint partnerships in a formal model of intergovernmental delegation and test the implications of the model on federal laws from 1973-2010. We argue with evidence that Congress may rely on collaborative non-fiscal partnerships with states and localities when technical uncertainty increases, but are less likely to do so when political uncertainty rises. Our theory extends existing models of delegation to provide an important step toward a broader theory of legislatively designed collaborative governance.

Keywords: Delegation, Federalism, Collaborative Governance

JEL Classification: H11, H49, H50, H77

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Clouser McCann, Pamela and Travaglini, Giulia Leila, Delegation, Collaborative Governance, and Non-Distributive Policy: The Curious Case of Joint Partnerships in American Federalism (September 23, 2018). Journal of Politics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3253897

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Pamela Clouser McCann

University of Southern California ( email )

Giulia Leila Travaglini

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

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