Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its Use

29 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2018

See all articles by Peter Carstensen

Peter Carstensen

University of Wisconsin Law School; American Antitrust Institute

Date Written: October 4, 2012

Abstract

Academic commentators have, over the years, lamented the failure of monopoly remedies to achieve effective relief. For some, the failure highlighted the foolishness of the law interfering with market structures and conduct, while for others it was evidence of the failure of the courts and law enforcers to act with sufficient boldness and courage. Both lines of critics focus on the options chosen and by implication assume that a better option would have existed if only those enforcing the law had adopted it. A third perspective has emerged in a few works, notably that of Professor and former Federal Trade Commissioner William Kovacic, who has pointed out the great difficulty of finding appropriate and workable remedies. One of his central observations is that in monopoly litigation, the remedy should be a central concern at the outset of the case and not an afterthought.

Keywords: monopoly, monopoly litigation, remedies, antitrust

JEL Classification: K10, K21

Suggested Citation

Carstensen, Peter C., Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its Use (October 4, 2012). Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, 2012, Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1456, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260714 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3260714

Peter C. Carstensen (Contact Author)

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