A World Government: A Critical Look into the Present, to Foresee the Future

24 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2018 Last revised: 2 Dec 2018

See all articles by Amin R. Yacoub

Amin R. Yacoub

New York University (NYU), School of Law

Date Written: October 5, 2018


Philosophers, legal scholars, and economists have long contemplated the possibility of establishing a world government: a super-state that will rule over planet Earth and prevent war to achieve the dream of perpetual peace. Both advocates and critics of the idea of world government have adopted an array of contrasting ideologies—from anarchism and liberalism to Nazism and communism—in order to justify their positions. Before pursuing the project of establishing a world government, perhaps as an outcome of globalization, policymakers and scholars must discuss the theoretical question of whether world government is a solution to humanity’s problems, or a curse that threatens states’ self-determination. In order to consider whether world government is theoretically desirable, this Comment will scrutinize the effectiveness of two current models of unification, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). These models show that three main factors can either unite or divide nations: the power of money, the sense of oneness, and the power of media. Based on an analysis of the UN and the EU, this Comment reaches the conclusion that a world government is unfeasible, no matter how desirable it is, as long as the right to self-determination exists.

Keywords: world-government, globalization, legal theory, political theory, philosophy, United Nations, European Union, Integration, Euroscepticism

Suggested Citation

R. Yacoub, Amin, A World Government: A Critical Look into the Present, to Foresee the Future (October 5, 2018). New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP), Vol. 50, No. 4, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3261974

Amin R. Yacoub (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU), School of Law ( email )

Manhattan, NY 10012
United States
3475574962 (Phone)

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