Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820

Posted: 30 Oct 2018

See all articles by Marco Casari

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Maurizio Lisciandra

University of Messina - Department of Economics

Claudio Tagliapietra

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

Does property rights allocation on the commons affect marriage strategies and fertility? We focus on the role played by patrilineal vs. egalitarian inheritance systems. Our approach combines a theoretical model and an empirical study that exploits an institutional shock at the turn of the 19th century, which made inheritance on the common property-resources egalitarian for everyone. We report that – as predicted by the model – communities with patrilineal inheritance rights on the commons exhibit higher levels of endogamy and consanguinity and lower fertility than those with egalitarian inheritance rights.

Keywords: Common-Pool Resources, Inheritance, Land Tenure, Napoleon

JEL Classification: D23, N53, P48,

Suggested Citation

Casari, Marco and Lisciandra, Maurizio and Tagliapietra, Claudio, Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820 (October 2018). Explorations in Economic History, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262095

Marco Casari (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Maurizio Lisciandra

University of Messina - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina, 98122
Italy
+39 (0)906764620 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/mlisciandra/

Claudio Tagliapietra

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

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