Revenue versus Spending-Based Consolidation Plans: The Role of Follow-Up

77 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2018

See all articles by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute; Netspar

Oana Furtuna

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Massimo Giuliodori

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE); Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 25, 2018

Abstract

The literature on fiscal multipliers finds that spending-based fiscal consolidations tend to have more benign macro-economic consequences than revenue-based consolidations. By directly comparing expost data with consolidation plans, we present evidence of a systematically weaker follow-up of spending-based consolidation plans. Next, using a newly-developed dataset of consolidation announcements, panel VAR regressions confirm the weaker follow-up of spending-based plans and their more benign macro-economic effects compared to those of revenue-based plans. We disentangle the role of the difference in follow-up from that of the difference in the composition of revenue- and spending-based consolidations. While the latter channel, which works through the difference between revenue and spending multipliers, explains the largest fraction of the difference in economic trajectories, the difference in follow-up plays a non-negligible role as well.

Keywords: fiscal consolidation announcements, follow-up, fiscal multipliers, panel vector autoregression, narrative identification

JEL Classification: E21, E62, H5

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Furtuna, Oana and Giuliodori, Massimo, Revenue versus Spending-Based Consolidation Plans: The Role of Follow-Up (September 25, 2018). ECB Working Paper No. 2178, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262446 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3262446

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)

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Oana Furtuna

University of Amsterdam ( email )

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Massimo Giuliodori

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE) ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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