Company Law is Bananas

33 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2018

See all articles by Kim J.S. Berg

Kim J.S. Berg

Maastricht University

Mark T. Kawakami

Maastricht University Faculty of Law; Maastricht University

Date Written: September 27, 2018

Abstract

While corporations wield tremendous amounts of power that can – in theory – ameliorate some of the global challenges that the world faces today, as things stand, the right incentives are not in place for the stakeholders to transform companies into socially responsible and environmentally conscious entities as a whole. While company law could be put forth as an instrument that incentivizes companies to be more socially aware and attentive to sustainability issues – in reality – relying on company law to change the true nature of companies and how they operate is akin to hammering a nail with a banana. While bananas are nutritious and delicious, they are not practical tools for a wide assortment of tasks. Similarly, although company law can serve a wide variety of purposes, it is not necessarily the instrument to change the incentives of corporate stakeholders to be more socially responsible in its present state.

Keywords: Company Law, CSR, Information/Choice Overload

JEL Classification: K10, K20, K32

Suggested Citation

Berg, Kim and Kawakami, Mark T., Company Law is Bananas (September 27, 2018). Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265199

Kim Berg

Maastricht University ( email )

Mark T. Kawakami (Contact Author)

Maastricht University Faculty of Law ( email )

Bouillonstraat 1-3
Maastricht, 6211 LH
Netherlands
630765612 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/mark.kawakami

Maastricht University ( email )

Bouillonstraat 1-3
Maastricht, 6211 LH
Netherlands
630765612 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/mark.kawakami

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