Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities

University of Siena Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 355

27 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2002  

Ugo Pagano

University of Siena - Department of Economics; Central European University (CEU)

Maria Alessandra Rossi

University of Siena - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2002

Abstract

In the New Property Rights model ownership of assets should be assigned to the most capable agents. While, in a world of incomplete contracts, the application of the model to IPRs provides insights on the nature of their second best allocation, also the opposite direction of causation may arise: owners of IPRs tend to develop more capabilities in the production of new IPRs. For some firms and countries, a virtuous complementarity between the development of IPRs and skills arises. For others the disincentive effect of the exclusion from intellectual property has more damaging consequences than the lack of access to material capital.

Keywords: Intellectual Property, Incomplete contracts, Incentives, Efficient Allocation, Institutional Complementarity

JEL Classification: D23, K11, K12, O34

Suggested Citation

Pagano, Ugo and Rossi, Maria Alessandra, Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities (July 2002). University of Siena Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 355. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=326588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.326588

Ugo Pagano (Contact Author)

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
I-53100 Siena
Italy
+39 057 7232614 (Phone)
+39 057 7232661 (Fax)

Central European University (CEU) ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary

Maria Alessandra Rossi

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy

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