Hijacking Lawyers: The Influence of the Market for Lawyers in the Competition of Civil Justice Systems

9 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2018

See all articles by Erlis Themeli

Erlis Themeli

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Date Written: May 17, 2015

Abstract

The competition of civil justice systems is a relatively new process in the EU area. In this process competing governments create the offer for law while, litigating parties create the demand for conflict resolution. The interaction between these parties is not fully clear. In this paper, I argue that the demand side is dominated by lawyers. This domination is a consequence of the lawyers market, the good they provide and the characteristics of the law. This domination influences the output of the demand side and might distort the proper working of the competition of civil justice systems.

Keywords: international commercial courts, private international law, law as a good, lawyers market, competition

Suggested Citation

Themeli, Erlis, Hijacking Lawyers: The Influence of the Market for Lawyers in the Competition of Civil Justice Systems (May 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266362

Erlis Themeli (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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