Fake Persuasion

27 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2018 Last revised: 22 Oct 2018

See all articles by Jacob Glazer

Jacob Glazer

Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management

Helios Herrera

University of Warwick

Motty Perry

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality; Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

We propose a model of product reviews with honest and fake reviews to study the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either honest, namely reveals the reviewer's true experience with the product/service, or fake, namely entirely fabricated in order to manipulate the public's beliefs. We establish that the equilibrium is unique and derive robust and interesting results about these markets. While fake agents are able to affect the public's beliefs in their preferred direction, aggregation of information takes place as long as some of the reviews are honest.

Keywords: Sender-Receiver Games

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Glazer, Jacob and Herrera, Helios and Perry, Motty and Perry, Motty, Fake Persuasion (October 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13244, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266438

Jacob Glazer (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Helios Herrera

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Motty Perry

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel

Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic ( email )

524 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

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