The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games

Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER) Working Paper Series 2018-15

48 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2018

See all articles by Sandro Casal

Sandro Casal

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)

Francesco Fallucchi

LISER

Simone Quercia

University of Bonn

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 3, 2018

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions only when fully informed about proposers’ behavior toward the NGO. Under complete information, their willingness to reject offers increases with the strength of the harm to the NGO. Moreover, the possibility to compensate the NGO through rejection further increases their willingness to reject. In a second study aimed at gauging the importance of different motives behind rejections, we show that the two most prevalent motives are to compensate the NGO or to diminish inequality between responders and proposers. Punishing proposers’ unkind intentions towards the NGO or rejecting on the basis of pure deontological reasons constitute less important motives.

Keywords: Mini Ultimatum Game, Morals, Experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D64

Suggested Citation

Casal, Sandro and Fallucchi, Francesco and Quercia, Simone, The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games (July 3, 2018). Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER) Working Paper Series 2018-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3267124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3267124

Sandro Casal (Contact Author)

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) ( email )

Via Conservatorio, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

Francesco Fallucchi

LISER ( email )

11, Porte des Sciences
Campus Belval – Maison des Sciences Humaines
Esch-sur-Alzette, L-4366
Luxembourg

Simone Quercia

University of Bonn ( email )

Institute for Applied Microeconomics
Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Bonn, 53113
Germany

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