CEO Compensation and the Transformation of Banking

Posted: 19 Jun 2003

See all articles by Maretno A. Harjoto

Maretno A. Harjoto

Pepperdine University - Pepperdine Graziadio Business School (PGBS)

Donald J. Mullineaux

University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics

Abstract

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992-2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than has been revealed by earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay-for-performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay-for-performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Harjoto, Maretno Agus and Mullineaux, Donald J., CEO Compensation and the Transformation of Banking. Journal of Financial Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=326720

Maretno Agus Harjoto (Contact Author)

Pepperdine University - Pepperdine Graziadio Business School (PGBS) ( email )

Drescher Campus Suite 344
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States
(310) 506-8542 (Phone)
(310) 506-4126 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=9-PfQi0AAAAJ

Donald J. Mullineaux

University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics ( email )

550 South Limestone
Lexington, KY 40506
United States
859-257-2890 (Phone)
859-257-9688 (Fax)

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