Bargaining Success in the Reform of the Eurozone

38 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2018

See all articles by Magnus Lundgren

Magnus Lundgren

Stockholm University

Stefanie Bailer

ETH Zürich - Center for Comparative and International Studies

Lisa Maria Dellmuth

Stockholm University

Jonas Tallberg

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science

Silvana Tarlea

University of Basel - EUROPAINSTITUT (the Institute for European Global Studies)

Date Written: October 19, 2018

Abstract

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Secondly, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success — particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Thirdly, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.

Keywords: European Union, Eurozone, Bargaining Success, Negotiations, European Council, Council of Ministers

Suggested Citation

Lundgren, Magnus and Bailer, Stefanie and Dellmuth, Lisa Maria and Tallberg, Jonas and Tarlea, Silvana, Bargaining Success in the Reform of the Eurozone (October 19, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269721

Magnus Lundgren (Contact Author)

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Stefanie Bailer

ETH Zürich - Center for Comparative and International Studies ( email )

Haldeneggsteig 4
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Lisa Maria Dellmuth

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.lisadellmuth.se

Jonas Tallberg

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Silvana Tarlea

University of Basel - EUROPAINSTITUT (the Institute for European Global Studies) ( email )

Gellertstrasse 27
Basel, 4052
Switzerland

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