The Lesser Shades of Labor Coercion: The Impact of Seigneurial Tenure in Nineteenth-Century Quebec

125 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2018 Last revised: 15 Mar 2023

See all articles by Vincent Geloso

Vincent Geloso

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Vadim Kufenko

University of Hohenheim - Institute of Economics

Alex Arsenault Morin

Queen's University

Date Written: October 20, 2018

Abstract

Can mild forms of labor coercion generate welfare effects as large as more extreme forms? Do these effects persist over time? To answer both questions, we use Quebec's system of seigneurial tenure (in effect until 1854) that granted landlords market power in the establishment of factories, and restricted worker mobility. This created a mild form of labor coercion as landlords had incentives to reduce employment and wage rates. To measure these effects, we rely on the Constitutional Act of 1791 which stated that all new lands had to be settled under a different tenure system. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that seigneurial tenure significantly depressed wages. The effect on wages is as large , or larger than, causal estimates of significantly more coercive labor regimes. We also find that by 1871, seventeen years after the institution's abolition, these effects had fully dissipated, suggesting that persistence is not an issue.

Keywords: Canadian Economic History, Monopsony, Labor Coercion, Economic Development

JEL Classification: N11, J42, R52

Suggested Citation

Geloso, Vincent and Kufenko, Vadim and Arsenault Morin, Alex, The Lesser Shades of Labor Coercion: The Impact of Seigneurial Tenure in Nineteenth-Century Quebec (October 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3270356

Vincent Geloso (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Vadim Kufenko

University of Hohenheim - Institute of Economics ( email )

Schloss-Mittelhof (Ost)
70593 Stuttgart
Germany

Alex Arsenault Morin

Queen's University ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
175
Abstract Views
1,911
Rank
342,145
PlumX Metrics