The Single Resolution Board As a New Form of Economic Governance

Abstract

Within Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (Board) was established as an EU agency with extensive decision-making powers both at the preventive phase of resolution planning and the resolution phase, when a resolution scheme needs to be actually applied. Such powers can be directly addressed to credit institutions, circumventing the National Resolution Authorities. Many scholars have expressed their concerns as regards the Board’s compatibility with the current EU legal order. However, to conclude on its compatibility one needs to understand in depth the functions of the Board, especially due to their highly technical nature. This paper aims to shed light to the unknown by conducting a competence-by-competence analysis of the Board’s powers, as well as examining the procedural safeguards that aim to mitigate these concerns, such as the role of the national resolution authorities and the Commission, the Board’s public interest assessment, and the ‘no creditor worse-off’ principle.

Keywords: Single Resolution Board, National Resolution Authorities, Procedural Safeguards, Public Interest Test, No Creditor Worse-Off principle