Is Judicial Restraint a Matter of Bright Lines or of Democratic Deference?
E-Pública: Revista Electrónica de Direito Público, Vol. 4, N.º 1, 2017.
13 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2018
Date Written: 2017
Abstract
Prompted by Stavros Tsakyrakis Essay ‘Justice Unrobed’, this Comment argues against a theory of judicial review that divides legislative and judicial competence along substantive lines (civil rights v. social rights and matters of principle v. matters of policy) and in favor of one that asks constitutional adjudicators to defer to the legislature on democratic grounds.
Keywords: Judicial Review, Financial Crisis, Social Rights, Democratic Deference
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Almeida Ribeiro, Gonçalo, Is Judicial Restraint a Matter of Bright Lines or of Democratic Deference? (2017). E-Pública: Revista Electrónica de Direito Público, Vol. 4, N.º 1, 2017., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271048
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