The Economic Consequences of Financial Audit Regulation in the Charitable Sector

52 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2018

See all articles by Raphael Duguay

Raphael Duguay

University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Students

Date Written: October 26, 2018

Abstract

I investigate how financial audit regulation in the charitable sector affects donor behavior. I propose that audit mandates alleviate moral-hazard concerns by (1) reinforcing donors’ belief that charities are monitored and (2) committing charities to obtain an audit ex post. My empirical strategy relies on variation in size-based exemption thresholds across states and differences in size driven by the nature of charities’ activities. Consistent with audit mandates reducing donors’ reliance on charity reputation, I find that donations are less concentrated on large, high-reputation charities. I show this reallocation of resources allows the charitable sector to serve more diverse geographic areas and social needs. In terms of the effect on willingness to give, I document that audit mandates are associated with a higher proportion of taxpayers who donate, especially among people with a high opportunity cost of time. However, I only observe a sizable impact on total contributions in dollars for charities that conduct activities that are particularly opaque to outside donors. Collectively, these results suggest audit regulation reduces information frictions and thereby affects resource allocation in the market for charitable giving.

Keywords: Financial-reporting regulation, auditing, resource allocation, nonprofit organizations

JEL Classification: M42, M48, M49, L31, L38

Suggested Citation

Duguay, Raphael, The Economic Consequences of Financial Audit Regulation in the Charitable Sector (October 26, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273498 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3273498

Raphael Duguay (Contact Author)

University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Students ( email )

Chicago, IL
United States

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