Financial analysis on social media and disclosure processing costs: Evidence from Seeking Alpha

47 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2018 Last revised: 29 Dec 2022

See all articles by Enrique Gomez

Enrique Gomez

Temple University

Frank Heflin

University of Georgia - J.M. Tull School of Accounting

James Moon

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

James Warren

University of Arkansas

Date Written: December 23, 2022

Abstract

Less-informed investors face greater costs of processing earnings news into actionable information. Our findings suggest financial analysis on social media reduces less-informed investors’ disclosure processing costs. Specifically, we document an attenuated spike in earnings announcement information asymmetry for quarters containing more financial analysis on social media in the weeks prior to the EA. Cross-sectional evidence suggests this finding is stronger when coverage from traditional intermediaries is lower, for financial analyses written by more credible authors, and for financial analyses that is more likely relevant to evaluating the EA. Further evidence suggests retail trades, but not institutional trades, at EAs are significantly more profitable in quarters with greater financial analysis on social media, consistent with financial analysis on social media benefitting traders who are otherwise less-informed. Overall, our evidence suggests that financial analysis on social media plays an important role in aiding less-informed investors by helping them better process EA news.

Keywords: Social Media, Information Asymmetry, Earnings Announcements

JEL Classification: M41, M21, G00, G12, O33

Suggested Citation

Gomez, Enrique and Heflin, Frank and Moon, James and Warren, James, Financial analysis on social media and disclosure processing costs: Evidence from Seeking Alpha (December 23, 2022). Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business Research Paper No. 18-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274644 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3274644

Enrique Gomez

Temple University ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

Frank Heflin

University of Georgia - J.M. Tull School of Accounting ( email )

Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-542-1616 (Phone)
706-542-3630 (Fax)

James Moon (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

James Warren

University of Arkansas ( email )

220 N McIlroy Ave
Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States

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