Reporting Corruption in Brazil: The Odebrecht Plea Bargain in Jornal Nacional

16 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2018

See all articles by Daniela Campello

Daniela Campello

Getúlio Vargas Foundation

Karine Belarmino

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

Debora Thomé

Columbia University - Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS)

Date Written: May 16, 2018

Abstract

Recent research suggests that, by informing citizens about politicians’ corrupt behavior, the media plays an important role in promoting democratic accountability in Brazil. Yet most of this work assumes that media coverage is politically neutral, overlooking a long-established literature on partisan bias in the news. This paper investigates the existence of bias in the coverage of the most pervasive corruption scandal ever documented in Brazilian politics – the Odebrecht case. Dubbed the “end of the world” plea bargain, the Odebrecht scandal involved the three spheres of public administration, executive and legislative powers, and politicians of all the major political parties. As such, it offers a unique opportunity for the study of media bias in Brazil, which can be potentially extended to other countries where Odebrecht operated.

Keywords: Corruption, Media Bias, Brazil, Scandal, Lavajato

Suggested Citation

Campello, Daniela and Belarmino, Karine and Thomé, Debora, Reporting Corruption in Brazil: The Odebrecht Plea Bargain in Jornal Nacional (May 16, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3274967

Daniela Campello (Contact Author)

Getúlio Vargas Foundation ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190
office 517
Rio de Janeiro, NJ Rio de Janeiro 22240070
United States
2137995809 (Phone)

Karine Belarmino

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities ( email )

420 Delaware St. SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Debora Thomé

Columbia University - Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) ( email )

New York, NY
United States

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