Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold‐Up Problem in the Two‐Sided Market for Academic Journals

49 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2018

See all articles by Mark J. McCabe

Mark J. McCabe

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; SKEMA Business School, Université Côte d’Azur (GREDEG), Sophia Antipolis, France

Christopher M. Snyder

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2018

Abstract

We analyze a model in which journals cannot commit to subscription fees when authors (who prefer low subscription fees because this boosts readership) make submission decisions. A hold‐up problem arises, manifested as excessive subscription fees. Open access is a crude attempt to avoid hold up by eliminating subscription fees. We assess the profitability and efficiency of traditional relative to open‐access journals in a monopoly model (with extensions to nonprofit, bundled, hybrid, and competing journals). We apply the theory to understand the evolving market for academic journals in the Internet age and policies currently being debated such as an open‐access mandate.

Suggested Citation

McCabe, Mark J. and Snyder, Christopher M., Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold‐Up Problem in the Two‐Sided Market for Academic Journals (June 2018). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 66, Issue 2, pp. 301-349, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12167

Mark J. McCabe (Contact Author)

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

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SKEMA Business School, Université Côte d’Azur (GREDEG), Sophia Antipolis, France ( email )

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SKEMA Business School, Economics Department
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Christopher M. Snyder

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

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(603) 646-2122 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~csnyder/

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

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