Random versus Directed Search for Scarce Resources

40 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2018 Last revised: 16 May 2019

Date Written: May 14, 2019


This paper studies how different search protocols affect social welfare in a search market with scarcity. Agents search for objects that differ in quality either through a random or a directed search protocol. Random search protocol, in which agents are randomly paired to an object of any quality, gives rise to adversely selected markets. Directed search protocol, in which agents choose with which quality types to pair, gives rise to congestion. When utility is either non-transferable or transferable through Nash bargaining, I show that random search dominates directed search in terms of welfare, even though each agent would prefer to be able to direct her search.

Keywords: random search, directed search, congestion, adverse selection

JEL Classification: C78, D62, D83

Suggested Citation

Mekonnen, Teddy, Random versus Directed Search for Scarce Resources (May 14, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275771

Teddy Mekonnen (Contact Author)

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman St
Providence, RI 02912-9029
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/teddymekonnen/

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