The Minimum Wage and Incentives for Full-Time Work Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test

CRR WP 2018-13

39 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2018

See all articles by Gary V. Engelhardt

Gary V. Engelhardt

Syracuse University - Center for Policy Research; Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

This paper examined how the earnings test affects the hours and employment of men who claim early benefits. It uses 1982-2016 data from the Current Population Survey and 1992-2014 data from the Health and Retirement Study. Critical components of the analysis include the idea that for any fixed earnings-test threshold amount, an increase in the hourly wage at which a beneficiary can work reduces the number of hours needed annually to hit the threshold. This feature of the test and substantial state-by-calendar year variation from increases in the minimum wage, which lower the threshold level of hours at which the earnings test binds, are used to identify the impact of the test on labor supply on the intensive and extensive margins for men who claim early.

Suggested Citation

Engelhardt, Gary V., The Minimum Wage and Incentives for Full-Time Work Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (October 2018). CRR WP 2018-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276208 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3276208

Gary V. Engelhardt (Contact Author)

Syracuse University - Center for Policy Research ( email )

426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244
United States
315-443-4598 (Phone)
315-443-1081 (Fax)

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
13
Abstract Views
222
PlumX Metrics