Mediated Persuasion

42 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2018

See all articles by Andrew Kosenko

Andrew Kosenko

Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, School of Management, Marist College; Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Date Written: October 31, 2018

Abstract

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. We characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, compare outcomes with and without a mediator and provide comparative statics with regard to the preferences of the sender and the mediator. We also provide novel conceptual and computational insights about the set of feasible posterior beliefs that the sender can induce, and use these results to obtain insights about equilibrium outcomes. The sender never benefits from mediation, while the receiver might. The receiver benefits when the mediator’s preferences are not perfectly aligned with hers; rather the mediator should prefer more information revelation than the sender, but less than perfect revelation.

Keywords: persuasion, information transmission, noisy communication, Blackwell criterion, strategic communicat

JEL Classification: D82, D83, C72

Suggested Citation

Kosenko, Andrew, Mediated Persuasion (October 31, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3276453

Andrew Kosenko (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, School of Management, Marist College ( email )

3399 North Road
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
United States

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh ( email )

4901 Wesley Posvar Hall
230 South Bouquet Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

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