Is this the real life or just fantasy? Refugee reception, extreme-right voting, and broadband internet

47 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2018 Last revised: 14 Aug 2020

See all articles by Matteo Gamalerio

Matteo Gamalerio

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Mario Luca

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS

Alessio Romarri

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)

Max Viskanic

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS

Date Written: August 14, 2020

Abstract

How does the reception of refugees affect the electoral performance of extreme-right parties? Does the effect change across areas with heterogeneous access to broadband internet? Using data on Italian refugee centers and an instrumental variable approach based on pre-existing group accommodation buildings, we show that hosting refugees leads to a decrease in extreme-right parties' vote shares. We estimate that municipalities that opened a refugee center between the 2013 and the 2018 national elections experienced a change in the votes shares of extreme-right parties approximately 7 percentage points lower than municipalities that did not open a refugee center. The negative effect is stronger for municipalities that opened smaller refugee centers and with lower access to broadband internet.

Keywords: Political Economy; Migration; Refugee reception; Broadband internet

JEL Classification: C36, D72, J15, P16, R23

Suggested Citation

Gamalerio, Matteo and Luca, Mario and Romarri, Alessio and Viskanic, Max, Is this the real life or just fantasy? Refugee reception, extreme-right voting, and broadband internet (August 14, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277550 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277550

Matteo Gamalerio (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) ( email )

c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Mario Luca

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS ( email )

28 rue des saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

Alessio Romarri

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Max Viskanic

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS ( email )

28 rue des saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

HOME PAGE: http://maxviskanic.com

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