Refugee reception, extreme-right voting, and compositional amenities: evidence from Italian municipalities

46 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2018 Last revised: 2 Oct 2021

See all articles by Matteo Gamalerio

Matteo Gamalerio

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Mario Luca

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS

Alessio Romarri

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)

Max Viskanic

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS

Date Written: October 1, 2021

Abstract

We use data from Italy to study the political and social impact of a refugee reception policy (SPRAR) directly managed by local governments, whose features recall the conditions of the contact theory (Allport, 1954). Instrumental variables estimates indicate that municipalities that opened a refugee center between the 2013 and 2018 national elections experienced a change in the vote shares of extreme-right parties approximately 7 percentage points lower compared to towns that did not open a refugee center. We document that the positive impact of SPRARs on “compositional amenities” (i.e., local schools) and population growth allows explaining the negative
impact on anti-immigrants’ prejudice. Finally, we provide evidence of spillovers in prejudice reduction in neighboring municipalities without a SPRAR.

Keywords: Refugee reception, far-right parties, compositional amenities, spillover effects

JEL Classification: C36, D72, J15, P16, R23

Suggested Citation

Gamalerio, Matteo and Luca, Mario and Romarri, Alessio and Viskanic, Max, Refugee reception, extreme-right voting, and compositional amenities: evidence from Italian municipalities (October 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277550 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277550

Matteo Gamalerio (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) ( email )

c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Mario Luca

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS ( email )

28 rue des saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

Alessio Romarri

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Max Viskanic

Department of Economics, Sciences Po-CNRS ( email )

28 rue des saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

HOME PAGE: http://maxviskanic.com

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