Equitable Voting Rules
29 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2018
Date Written: November 3, 2018
A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (May, 1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.
Keywords: Voting Rules, May's Theorem, Equity, Social Choice, Finite Groups
JEL Classification: C60, D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation