Shareholder Satisfaction with Overlapping Directors

54 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2020

See all articles by Rachel Li

Rachel Li

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Miriam Schwartz-Ziv

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Finance and Banking

Date Written: January 13, 2020

Abstract

Mutual fund shareholders are particularly supportive of “overlapping directors”—directors who serve simultaneously on a corporate board and a mutual fund board. Such support is observed on behalf of both connected funds (sharing a director with the company) and non-connected funds (not sharing a director with the company), and is particularly prominent when monitoring is needed. Our results suggest that the benefits offered by overlapping directors to all fund shareholders exceed the costs arising from their potential conflicts of interest, and that the benefits they offer are more valuable to mutual fund shareholders than to other types of shareholders.

Keywords: overlapping directors, interlocking boards, busy directors, mutual funds, shareholder votes, boards, directors

JEL Classification: G3, L20

Suggested Citation

Li, Qingqiu and Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam, Shareholder Satisfaction with Overlapping Directors (January 13, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3278243

Qingqiu Li

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Miriam Schwartz-Ziv (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Finance and Banking ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
118
Abstract Views
1,184
rank
257,584
PlumX Metrics