Common Pool Resources: Is There Support for Conservationists?

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-083/VIII

21 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2018

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM); VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

Date Written: November 1, 2018

Abstract

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.

Keywords: Cartel Games, Coalition Formation, Common Pool Resources, Support

JEL Classification: C72, D02, Q20

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Weikard, Hans-Peter, Common Pool Resources: Is There Support for Conservationists? (November 1, 2018). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-083/VIII. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3278575

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM)

De Boelelaan 1087
Amsterdam, 1081 HV
Netherlands

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

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