Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis

62 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2018

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Valentin Lang

University of Zurich

B. Peter Rosendorff

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries' votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks.

Keywords: Aid, IMF, United Nations Security Council, voting, World Bank

JEL Classification: F35, O11, O19

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Lang, Valentin and Rosendorff, Bryan Peter and Vreeland, James Raymond, Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis (October 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13290, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278665

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Valentin Lang

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Bryan Peter Rosendorff

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

19 West 4th St.
2nd Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
1,318
PlumX Metrics