Meet the Press: Survey Evidence on Financial Journalists as Information Intermediaries

66 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2018 Last revised: 28 Dec 2018

See all articles by Andrew C. Call

Andrew C. Call

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy

Scott A. Emett

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy

Eldar Maksymov

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy

Nathan Y. Sharp

Texas A&M University - Department of Accounting

Date Written: December 27, 2018

Abstract

We survey 462 financial journalists and conduct 18 follow-up interviews to provide new insights into the inputs, incentives, and beliefs that shape their reporting. Our findings can be summarized in four themes. First, financial journalists rely heavily on private communication with company management when developing articles, but they often face backlash from management in response to unfavorable articles. Second, sell-side analysts are an important source of information for financial journalists, and journalists value experienced analysts over prominent or award-winning analysts. Third, journalists believe monitoring companies to hold them accountable is one of financial journalism’s most important objectives, and they believe negative articles are more impactful than other articles they write. Fourth, financial journalists have strong incentives to develop high-quality articles that contain exclusive content; nevertheless, they have a taste for controversial topics. We examine a wide range of other topics relevant to the literature on the business press, and our results provide multiple avenues for future research in this area.

Keywords: business press, financial journalists, media, information intermediaries, social media, financial analysts

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M49, G10, G14, G20, G29, L82

Suggested Citation

Call, Andrew C. and Emett, Scott A. and Maksymov, Eldar M. and Sharp, Nathan Y., Meet the Press: Survey Evidence on Financial Journalists as Information Intermediaries (December 27, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279453

Andrew C. Call (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Scott A. Emett

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Eldar M. Maksymov

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Nathan Y. Sharp

Texas A&M University - Department of Accounting ( email )

4353 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-4353
United States
979-845-0338 (Phone)

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