Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy

62 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2018

See all articles by Sandeep Vaheesan

Sandeep Vaheesan

Open Markets Institute

Nathan Schneider

University of Colorado Boulder

Date Written: November 6, 2018

Abstract

After decades of neglect, antitrust is once again a topic of public debate. Proponents of reviving antitrust have called for abandoning the narrow consumer welfare model and embracing a broader set of objectives. One essential element that has been overlooked thus far is the ownership structure of the firm itself. The dominant model of investor-owned business and associated philosophy of shareholder wealth maximization exacerbate the pernicious effects of market power. In contrast, cooperative ownership models can mitigate the effects of monopoly and oligopoly and advance the interests of consumers, workers, small business owners, and citizens. The promotion of competition among large firms should be paired with support for democratic cooperation within firms.

Antitrust law has had a complicated history and relationship with cooperative enterprise. Corporations threatened by cooperatives have used the antitrust laws to frustrate the growth of these alternative businesses. To insulate cooperatives from the antitrust threat, Congress has enacted exemptions to protect cooperative entities, notably a general immunity for farm cooperatives in the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act. As part of an agenda to tame corporate monopoly, all three branches of the federal government and the states should revisit these ideas and seek to protect and enable the cooperative model across the economy. While protections that farmers fought for a century ago may seem obsolete in an era of big-box retail and online platforms, matters of ownership design have at least as much relevance today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal.

Keywords: antitrust, antimonopoly, cooperatives

Suggested Citation

Vaheesan, Sandeep and Schneider, Nathan, Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy (November 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279629 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279629

Sandeep Vaheesan (Contact Author)

Open Markets Institute ( email )

1440 G St NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/

Nathan Schneider

University of Colorado Boulder ( email )

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
115
rank
227,225
Abstract Views
690
PlumX Metrics